

without endeavouring to step out again from its isolation by joining a supersensuous ideal reality.

(3.) With still greater one-sidedness does the Scepticism exhibit the practical-subjective tendency of resignation. Renouncing all cognition, it seeks tranquillity and satisfaction in the isolation and independence which complete ignorance affords.

(4.) Again, the sentimental trait predominates in the Neo-Platonism. All the before mentioned characteristic features reappear once more in this philosophy, and the conflict of them becomes accordingly very manifest here. On the whole the desire to resign one's self to a pure, unalloyed original reality, predominates, as stated above. The Naturalism and the tendency of relying on one's self cannot cope with it.

Although the Neo-Platonism makes Nature to emanate from the Absolute (God) in a pantheistic way, and connects it again with it by mediate links, it nevertheless contrasts in a dualistic way the corrupt and imperfect being of Sensuous Nature with the pure and perfect being of the Absolute. Accordingly it demands an entire withdrawal from the former and an unconditional surrender to the latter.

On the former demand the Neo-Platonism concurs with all the other systems of the third period. Yet the demand assumes here a quite particular character. It betrays no longer the proud self-reliance with which the Stoics had opposed their superior Ego to Nature as the inferior principle, rather does it betray fear for Nature as the principle of what is bad and dangerous, fear for a power which one wishes to escape. The withdrawal from the world becomes here a flight from the world.

Practical-subjective

Naturalism
Sentimental
predominant

1. Absolute (Nature)
2. sensuous
∴ must live in
unity with the Absolute

a flight from
the world

And the ultimate aim of this flight is not the self-sufficient independence of the Epicureic. On the contrary, more than in any other system of the third period does it become manifest in the Neo-Platonism, that one retires from the world only in order to throw one's self into the arms of a better and nobler power, the Absolute. The desire for independence gives way at once to the enthusiastic longing for union with the Absolute, the confidence in one's own strength gives way to a spirit of embarrassment, despair and helplessness, and this consciousness of one's own distress causes just the desire to be saved from it by a higher power.

It is in keeping herewith, when the rational (or sceptical) cognition of the other systems gives way here to a mystic intuition (revelation). For by such an intuition alone can one hope to obtain the knowledge of and the union with the inexpressible Absolute.

The contrast of the Heavenly and the Earthly which in the Neo-Platonic philosophy combats the pantheistic proclivities of the same philosophy, the longing for salvation and the doctrine of revelation: these are features which the Neo-Platonism possesses in common with the *christian religion* which, in the meantime, had already entered upon its victorious course through the world.

In conclusion, let us briefly recapitulate once more the principal characteristic features of the Post-Aristotelian philosophy.

We ascertained first, in this period, a relaxation of the speculative power of the Greek genius. No new

rational cognition
finds way to mystic
intuition - longing
of salvation + the
desire of revelation

1. Metaphysically eclectic
2. Ethics + practical phil. was laid much stress on - practical subjective withdrawal from Nature
3. Theory of cognition (147) union with nature } Absolute Reason etc
Cosmopolitan

original metaphysical systems make their appearance. In a metaphysical respect the philosophy of this period is eclectic, if not sceptic or mystic.

The centre of gravity of the Post-Aristotelian philosophy is Ethics or practical philosophy; and here it produced original and in their way even magnificent views.

Next to that, and in accordance with the critical-sceptical spirit of the time, the theory of cognition is studied and promoted.

In the moral speculations of the time we meet with a practical-subjective tendency of pessimistic resignation and daring withdrawal from the external world, which however, is counter-balanced by the desire for union with a universal all-encompassing reality. Owing to the exhaustion of the speculative power this desire cannot find a metaphysical expression. It appears therefore only as sentimental longing or in mystic-religious form. An effect of this spirit is also the cosmopolitanism of this period.

It is questionable, how far the philosophy of the 3rd period has been influenced by the Orient. Evidently is this the case with the Neo-Platonism which has greatly been influenced by oriental and christian ideas.

1. THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY.

Zeno of Citium (Cyprus), 300, B. C. is the founder of the Stoic school. He studied the Megaric, Heraclitic and Platonic philosophy, and heard the lectures of Krates, an adherent of the Cynic school. The influence of all these systems, particularly of the Cynic philosophy, makes itself felt in the Stoic philosophy.

Stoic { Logic. evidence for practical conduct
 { Physic. good ^(material) for a person's well-being
 { Ethics good = concern acquisition of virt.
 Practical, the object of Phi. is to study virtue, to establish rules of conduct

The name of the Stoic school is derived from the hall in which Zeno lectured and the members of the school used to assemble. The walls of this hall were covered with pictures representing scenes of the Persian wars, and the hall was accordingly called *στοὴ ζωική*, i. e. "the checkered or gaycoloured hall."

The practical tendency of the philosophy of the third period appears very clearly in the Stoic philosophy. According to the Stoics, philosophy is "the study of virtue." That is to say, the principal, nay the sole object of philosophy is to establish rules of conduct. Theoretical knowledge has value only as far as it helps us to establish principles of conduct. The Stoics admit, however, that the principles of practical conduct are to be derived from the knowledge of things. Hence they have—the earlier Stoics at least—a Metaphysic. But even they show their indifference towards metaphysical speculations by adopting simply a metaphysical doctrine of the Pre-Socratic philosophy—the Heraclitic doctrine—instead of establishing a Metaphysic of their own.

The Stoic system divides into three parts.

a. Logic.

Since the principles of practical conduct depend upon knowledge, the methods of obtaining and the extent of knowledge must be investigated in order to get a criterion by which we can distinguish truth from falsehood.

The above is the problem proposed to Logic.

The Stoics establish an outspoken empirical theory of knowledge. With them, experience is the sole source of knowledge. Like a blank sheet of paper, the human mind is at first devoid of all content, i. e. of all knowledge; all content is given to it by the objects.

Study of Virtue - from theoretical knowledge - from Metaph. of Pre-Socratic & Heraclitic

experience

to establish rules of conduct

Sense perceptions - memory
 - Idea - science (True ideas, connection)
 { immediate
 { derived - by syllogism
 tested by experience, regards its validity (149)

External objects act upon the soul by means of impressions which they make upon it through the medium of the sense-organs. Thus sense-perceptions are the first elements of all cognition. These sense-perceptions are preserved and reproduced by memory, and are by the psychic mechanism transformed into ideas (general representations) which, however, as abstracted from common experience, have no scientific value. Their validity must first be confirmed by science. The criterion by which the truth of any given idea is determined, is the character of evidence which some of our ideas carry with them. Some of our ideas are so qualified that we cannot help considering them as really valid, that is as ideas to which an object corresponds in external reality. Such ideas, then, are true. Science is a system of connected true ideas, both immediate and derived, the latter being derived from the former by means of the logical Syllogism (the theory of which was studied very energetically and successfully in the Stoic school). There must be, the Stoics argue, a criterion of truth, because otherwise knowledge and accordingly rational conduct, i. e. conduct based on knowledge, would be impossible. Thus, again, the practical consideration that there must be conduct, is the decisive argument for the necessity of theoretical truth.

b. Physics.

The Stoic Physics (Metaphysics) appears at first sight a decided Materialism. Reality, they say, have only material substances that act and are acted upon. They are the constituents of all reality. Also the human soul is accordingly a material substance which only by its thinness differs from the coarser substances of which

sense perception

reality = material
 soul = material

the body is built up. With this statement conflicts their assertion that Space (sc. void space) and Time and thoughts are immaterial and have nevertheless reality. Still more does the Stoic materialism diverge from the mechanical materialism of Democritus by the Dynamism which they connected with it. From the inert matter they distinguished the forces by which it is animated. The whole universe is pervaded by such dynamic forces. The consistency and throughgoing connection of all the parts of the universe necessitates us to trace back all these forces to one universal force penetrating the whole world and filling it with its presence. This universal force they identified again with reason and called it God. It is a conscious reason, because only from conscious reason the human conscious reason can have sprung. All order and harmony in the world must be traced back to that conscious force as to their ultimate cause. Their pantheistic—monistic proclivities prevented the Stoics from separating dualistically the divine force or God from Nature. They rather identified it again with a material substance, viz. Fire or fiery breeze, and established thus a naturalistic Pantheism (Hylozoism). This all-encompassing fiery breeze is the ground of all reality. The whole world emanates from it, is pervaded by it, and will be absorbed again by it in order to emanate then anew (comp. Heraclitus). Since all things are but various manifestations of the ultimate ground, all things are necessarily ruled by it. The whole course of the world is determined by it in every detail. Nothing can happen which was not foreseen and demanded by the absolute reason of the world. The Stoic doctrine is—as follows from the Stoic naturalistic pantheism—a stern Determinism and Fatalism.

I conflict
with space time
thought

Dynamism

All force = universal
force = God = Reason
= fiery breeze
= Hylozoism
~ Fatalism

c. Ethics

The course of the world is in every detail predetermined by Fate. No thing or being can escape its fate; no thing can stop or alter the determined course of the world. Every thing must fulfil its natural destination. The sole advantage which Man has over other beings is that he can consciously fulfil his destination. This is what the Stoics advise him to do. Since we cannot revolt against Fate we should bear it with equanimity. Since we cannot alter the course of the world we should adapt ourselves to and acquiesce in it, thus preserving our dignity and independence. A perfect apathy, a tranquillity of mind which treats with entire indifference every thing: this is the attitude we must ~~obtain~~ ^{take} towards the things. Such apathic indifference is the sole good to be acquired by man. All other so called "goods" such as Wealth, Honor, etc. are no real goods in the opinion of the Stoics. If we do not care in the least for the things we shall not suffer from them; they will not trouble or molest us. Thus evils do not exist for us, and to be free from evils means to be happy.

The acquiescence in the actual course of the world involves thus an independence from the seductive charms of the sensuous things which is not quite compatible with that tendency. The acquiescence in the world means a passive enduring of all the ups and downs of life. The Stoics, however, advise man to struggle hard for independence, to make himself independent of things. Here the subjective tendency comes to the fore. That independence of mind which frees us from the things, can be acquired only by indefatigable earnest efforts. We must suppress and mortify our sensuous

Good = conscious fulfilment of
fate = happiness

passivity & suffer
active & emancipation
from sensual temptation

Stoicism, practical endoch

appetites and passions which tie us to the things, and develop Reason, the noblest of the human faculties. If Reason dominates us, we are independent of the things; we understand them dearly without being affected by them. What makes us love and hate, desire and fear things, is just our passions, our appetites. Having extinguished them, we are no longer teased by them. Thus tranquillity of mind is the natural effect of developed reason, as passions and affections are the inevitable effects of undeveloped reason. The Stoics, therefore, regard the latter as mental diseases.

The transition from the state of mental illness to mental healthiness is a sharp and sudden one. Hence it follows that every individual is either a complete sage or a complete fool. The sage is wise in every respect; the fool is foolish in every respect. No mutual intercourse is possible between the fools and the sages. Hence the wise man will not care much for the national, social, and other institutions, habits and prejudices of the fools. He prefers to live for himself or in community with his fellow-sages (cosmopolitism).

The subjective tendency to emancipate us from all that binds us to the things, *is not wholly in keeping with the other tendency of acquiescing in Nature.* The Stoics will argue that by developing the faculty of reason we live "according to (our own) nature," since reason is the most significant constituent of human nature. And they will add that, by living according to our own true nature, we fulfil, at the same time, also the will of Nature that has given us the faculty of reason and thus destined us for the development of reason. But since Nature has given us also the other faculties, sensuous

appetites and so forth, the development of these would just so well be "according to nature," as the development of reason. In advising man to develop reason and to suppress the appetites the Stoics place Man at once in opposition to and in harmony with Nature.

The later Stoics have indeed mitigated the rigorous doctrine of the earlier members of the school (Chrysippus, Eratosthenes and others).

The principles of the moderate Stoicism made their entry also into the *Roman world*. The manly sense of independence and the principle of equanimity and self-possession accentuated by the Stoic philosophy recommended this philosophy to the proud and energetic Roman mind. The Roman Stoics were, however, too much of politicians to share the contempt for the State of the Greek Stoics.

Of Roman Stoics we mention

Panaetius	140. B. C.
Seneca	40. A. D.
Epictetus	60. A. D.
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (Roman Emperor)	150. A. D.

2. THE EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHY.

Epicurus of Samos 300. B. C., the founder of the Epicurean school, studied the Aristotelian, the Cyrenaic, and the Democritic philosophy. His own philosophy is a combination of these systems.

The practical aim of all philosophy is still more emphasized by Epicurus and his followers than by the Stoics. It is merely for the sake of learning from it

Nature { Reason
Appetite :: to live according to nature means to develop both sides :: the contradiction of the Stoics

The object of phil. is to live a happy life
 hunting after pleasure.
 Knowledge furnishes the means of pleasure
 Ignorance is the source of evil
 (154)

how we can realize the practical aims of life, i. e. to live a most perfect and happy life, that we study philosophy. The only reasonable practical aim which it would be absurd to call in question, is Pleasure. This is, besides, confirmed by the fact that all creatures do actually strive for pleasure. Knowledge furnishes the means of acquiring pleasure, Ignorance and Superstition, the effect of Ignorance, prevent us from getting and enjoying what is pleasant. They must therefore be considered the sources of all evils. It is therefore all-important to free one's self from ignorance and superstition and to acquire true knowledge.

a. Logic.

Logic is the science which gives us the criteria by which to distinguish truth from falsehood.—

All knowledge has its source in sense-perceptions. The truth of our sense-perceptions cannot be called in question. The senses never deceive us. What they report is always real and accordingly true. All error is but a false interpretation of that which the senses present. Biassed by false prejudices we interpret the reports of the senses in a false way, refer them to things that have no real existence. Only such conceptions and judgments can be held true that can be traced back to actual sensations. In other words: true is all knowledge that is confirmed by the data of experience. All other knowledge is but an aggregate of prejudices and superstitions.

b. Physics.

It is wholly in keeping with this empirico-sensualistic theory of knowledge as well as with the practical tendency of the school, when the Epicureans, in their

1. Mechanical explanation of the world
2. Denial the work of a supernatural power.
3. on adapting laws to make the best use of it

Physics, regard the world as a mechanism of material things. The senses, indeed, show us nothing else in the world than material things existing and moving in space and acting according to mechanical laws. The deeper metaphysical thoughts concerning the ultimate structure of reality must, for him who recognizes in the senses the sole source of knowledge, appear mere fancies and unjustified superstitions. The mechanical view of Nature was, further, the only one adapted to the practical standard of the Epicurean philosophy. A philosophy which regards the strife for pleasure as the ultimate end of all human activity, can regard the world only as a mechanism of means which we are to employ and with which we must arrange ourselves in the pursuance of that end.—

The Epicureans reject accordingly as false and absurd that view of Nature which sees in Nature the work of a design and regards the phenomena of Nature as productions of a supernatural power. Nothing is, in their opinion, more pernicious than the wide-spread prejudice that a conscious supreme being directs the course of the world and interferes with the fate of Man. It is this fear for superhuman beings, which deprives us of all tranquillity and cheerfulness and makes our life so unhappy. And yet no view is so illfounded as this. Experience discloses no trace of design or purpose in Nature. On the contrary, it shows clearly that every thing in Nature is the necessary effect of foregoing causes. Hence the view that regards Nature as a system of mechanical causes and effects is the only one which the established facts of experience justify.

With this system of mechanical causes and effects we

Sensation is the source of all true knowledge

for fools
 for ages, etc

1

atom { fall in equal rapidity
 diverge from vertical line & come form. of
 ? Death is the dissolution of atoms
 4 thin small skin of a thing enter
 us & contact the sensation

have now to arrange ourselves in order to make the most profitable use of it. Knowing the laws of Nature we can adapt them to our ends and thus compel the things and laws of Nature to work for us.

The physical doctrines of Democritus recommended here themselves to the Epicureans because of their pure mechanical character. The Epicureans, therefore, accept the Democritic Physics as theoretical substructure to their practical philosophy. They modify it, however, in some points. That the formation of individual things were due to the different rapidity with which the atoms fall down in the empty space, is not admitted by Epicurus. He knew already that in the empty space all bodies fall down with equal rapidity. He seeks the cause of the junction of the atoms in the circumstance that the atoms in their downfall diverge a little from the straight vertical line, in consequence where of they come in contact with one another. All things, the human soul not excepted, are compositions of material atoms. The human soul consists of very fine fiery atoms. Death, which means the dissolution of the atoms of the soul, is accordingly the absolute and definitive end of Man's life. It is absurd to speak of the immortality of the soul. Small thin skins which drop off from the things and preserving the form of them enter our body through the pores of the skin, cause in our brain certain impressions (sensations) which are true copies of the things from which they have come.

c. Ethics.

The external world is, as stated in Physics, a mechanism of material things ready for use for every body who knows to use it. The only reasonable use which

Happiness = goal of conduct
 but unbridled passions
 but absence of pain & tranquillity
 (157)

we can make of it is to use it for the improvement of the conditions of our life, i. e. for the increase of our happiness. Pleasure and absence of pain is the only end the value of which cannot be called in question.

The strife for pleasure, however, which the eudaimonistic Ethics of Epicurus sets down as goal of conduct, does not mean that we ought to grasp and enjoy every lust indiscriminately that comes within our reach. On the contrary, the wise and judicious man knows too well, that real (that is *lasting*) happiness consists not so much in the enjoyment of many positive pleasures—which soon pass away and do not satisfy us perfectly—as in the absence of pain and a tranquil state of mind. Equanimity, or tranquillity of mind, is the highest happiness. This equanimity can only be obtained by a virtuous conduct. That is to say, to get that absolute satisfaction which equanimity affords, we must learn to suppress our unbridled passions and appetites. We must learn to renounce pleasure in order to get perfect happiness. For the pleasure which the satisfaction of these appetites affords is accompanied or followed by evils. To avoid them, we must become independent of the appetites of the senses and the lower desires, and to become independent of them, we must restrict our wants and needs to a minimum. Renouncing imaginary goods we get rid of the cares and troubles, fears and disappointments that accompany them, and find satisfaction and lasting happiness in the permanent tranquillity and independence of our mind (ataraxy).

Thus the Epicurean philosophy comes *practically* back to standing-point of the Stoics. The practical difference between the Stoic and Epicurean ethical

for fools
 for ages, 62

Happiness with Democritus on Liberty

I

157

1

standard is indeed exceedingly small. But the emphatic accentuation of the pleasure-principle and the open confession that virtuous conduct is valuable merely because it is conducive to happiness, distinguishes Epicurus' from the Stoic ethical doctrine.

Questionable is also for the Epicureans the value of the State. They do not care much for it, taking no interest in political questions. They make the best of it. The State is for them a necessary evil which one has to endure in order to avoid the still greater evil of state-less anarchy. If all men were wise, the State could be dispensed with. As matters stand, the State is a necessity, it protects the individual (by laws and punishments) against the pernicious instincts of the unjudicious vulgar. For this reason the Epicurean philosopher submits to the authority of the State. He fulfils the unavoidable duties of a citizen, trying to reduce them to a minimum, and cares not a straw more for the state than is just unavoidable.

The most important *Roman* adherent of the Epicurean doctrine was Titus Lucretius Carus (Work: *De rerum natura*) 75. B. C.

(3.) THE SCEPTICISM.

The views of the Greek Sceptics are very similar to those of the Sophists. With them they deny every possibility of an objective knowledge, with them they try to prove this point polemically and historically referring to the diversity of the philosophical systems established in the course of time, each of which had refuted its predecessor and was itself refuted again by

The conception about the state

for fools
for ages, etc

Impossibility objective knowledge
historically
1. Polemically: failure of Plato & Aristotle
2. Polemically

its successor. After even men like Plato and Aristotle had failed in their efforts to obtain a knowledge of the Absolute, the assertion that such a knowledge be impossible seemed to be highly creditable, and thus the sceptic views gained easily more and more ground. There was now nothing to stop this sceptic movement. The speculative forces of the Greek mind were exhausted and no new Socrates or Plato arose to set bounds to this extreme Scepticism.

From the fact that no objective knowledge is obtainable the sceptics concluded that we ought to restrain our judgment in order to avoid the evil consequences of a too rash decision. We should never say: this is so, but should content ourselves with saying: It seems so, it may be so, etc. The same precaution should be taken also in all decisions of the will. All sorrows and afflictions are caused by too hasty resolutions based on insufficient information. If we avoid such uncertain judgments we avoid also their evil practical consequences. If we do not pique ourselves on our knowledge of the things, if we confess to know nothing, then we have no reason to prefer one thing to another and cannot accordingly be misled by our desire for this or that thing. Renouncing all such foolish desires—which if we cannot satisfy them cause uneasiness and if we satisfy them awake only new desires and so also new uneasiness—we escape also the above evil consequences and acquire thus that equanimity and tranquillity of the soul which the Stoic philosophers rightly cherished as the highest good. In possession of such a good the wise man will readily give up the imaginary "good" of a metaphysical cognition. For our practical needs in every

avoid uncertain judgments
for { theoretical reasons
practical — renounce foolish desires

(160)

day's life that degree of certainty respectively probability which experience affords, is perfectly sufficient.

One distinguishes usually in the Greek Scepticism various *schools*; the school of Pyrrho, the so-called "younger" Academy of Arkesilaos, the so-called "third" Academy, the "younger" Sceptics (Anesidemus), and the school of Sextus.

The great number of sceptic schools in which the sceptic doctrines were cultivated during several centuries speaks for the influence which these doctrines exerted in the third period of the Greek philosophy. Since however the views of these schools did not differ much from one another, we need not deal with the particulars of their doctrines but may content ourselves with giving the names of the most prominent sceptic philosophers.

Pyrrho of Elis 300 B. C.

Arkesilaos of Athens 275 B. C.

Karneades of Cyrene 150 B. C. (156 envoy extraordinary in Rome, speech on "justice").

Philo of Larissa 100 B. C.

Marcus Tullius Cicero 75 B. C. (more *eclectic* than *sceptic*).

Anesidemus of Knossus 25 B. C.

Sextus Empiricus 200 A. D.

4. THE NEO-PLATONISM.

The Neo-Platonic philosophy, growing up simultaneously with the later Sceptic schools, has in common with the other systems of the third period the sceptic refusal of rational Metaphysic. This philosophy may be regarded as the completion as well as the self-dissolu-

Self-dissolution of the scepticism
& mysticism

(161)

tion of the Scepticism. It overstrains the sceptic principle by developing it into its utmost consequences and converts thus the Scepticism into a Mysticism. That no rational cognition of the nature of Things is possible, is maintained by the Neo-Platonism as by the Scepticism. Over-against the metaphysical tendency of the second period the Neo-Platonism emphasizes the practical subjective tendency so peculiar to the systems of the third period. But it does not stop there. The implicit confidence which the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers and even the Sceptics had placed in reason as a practical power, is not shared by the Neo-Platonic philosophers. Whereas the former had trusted reason and thought it capable to procure to men that permanent tranquillity of the mind on which all true happiness depends, the Neo-Platonists distrust reason also in this respect. They call in question even this practical capacity of reason. The bold self-confidence of the Stoics gives way here to a deep-rooted conviction of the utter weakness of reason. This feeling of weakness inspires them with a longing for a power to which they might attach themselves and apply for support. Since Nature—owing to its inferiority—cannot afford this support, it must be found in a super-natural power. The longing for this power is accompanied by the desire to know or rather to intuit it. A rational cognition of the Supernatural is, however, impossible; the Neo-Platonics are not inclined to renew the unsuccessful attempts of the second period to comprehend the Absolute by means of reason. The Absolute can be cognized only by a super-rational process. It must be revealed to us.

Distrust for
reason

trust for super-
natural power

mystical & not
rational cognition
of the Absolute

for fools
for ages, etc

11

It is only in a state of super-rational mystic illumination that we intuit the Absolute. It is the Platonic intuitive knowledge which here appears again in the shape of a mystic ecstasy, a visionary illumination which, resulting from a complete extinction of sensation, reason, consciousness, reveals us things—the Absolute or God!—which rational thought is unable to comprehend. Such a state of illumination is, as a matter of course, the highest felicity which men can enjoy. Compared with it all earthly pleasures appear vain and worthless.

The Platonic idealism which opposes the ideal world to the real but imperfect world of sensuous things, is completed in the Neo-Platonic philosophy. That the given world is far inferior in worth to the ideal world and ought to be exchanged for the same is a view which, together with the principle of salvation, stands now in the foreground of all thought. The Neo-Platonism, itself influenced by oriental, jewish and christian speculations, marks the transition from the antique to the mediaeval philosophy. It fore-runs christianity.

The herald and fore-runner of the Neo-Platonic philosophy,

PHILO of Alexandria, 30 B.C.—50 A. D., was a Jew, equally well versed in his national religion and in the Greek, particularly the Platonic philosophy. In his own philosophy he combines into one Platonic doctrines and religious views taken from the Old Testament. His philosophy prepares as well the appearance of Christ which immediately follows it as also the Neo-Platonic philosophy.

Completion of
the Platonic Idealism

Plato + religious views
from the Old Testament

God { incomprehensible, perfect
transcendent
active, creative

At the centre of Philo's system stands the idea of God. God is absolutely perfect or even super-perfect, so perfect indeed that no word or concept can express his perfectness. He is incomprehensible, indescribable, unknow-⁽¹⁾able. We cannot say, accordingly, what he is; we can only express, by negative predicates, what he is not. It appears that this absolute Being (Jahveh) must be toto-coelo different from all known reality. God is trans⁽²⁾endent, separated from the world by an infinite cleft. And yet this transcendent God is also the creative ground of all goodness and perfectness which the world contains. God is accordingly active⁽³⁾; he acts upon things. How can now the absolute transcendency of God consist with the activity displayed by him? The same difficulty had once puzzled Plato (comp. p. 99-100), and he had tried to escape it by inserting a mediating link between the Ideas and the world of Things. To the same means Philo too takes his refuge. The distance between God and the world being, however, so very great, he is not content with only one mediator; quite a number of them are required by him. First emanates from God the "Logos" whom Philo, in anticipation of the christian view, calls the son of God. The Logos is the intellect of God, the absolute idea that contains in itself all other ideas, the fundamental force from which all forces in the world arise. Notwithstanding these anthropomorphic predicates given by Philo to the Logos it is very uncertain whether Philo means by it a personal being or a quality or force of God, the quintessence and sum-total of all forces acting in the world. Occasionally he speaks of the latter as vassals or servants of the Logos, and calls

Logos connect
to God + world
the source of idea
& force

Logos personal
being or force?

reality { God - perfect
 Logos
 Idea
 Matter most imperfect = nothing

Dualism
 of the Absolute

(164)
 can not be deduced from God because of its

them demons and angels. Be this as it may, the Logos is at any rate the first and noblest emanation: all other emanations having their source in him. Following down the series of emanations whose perfectness gradually decreases in proportion to the increasing distance from the Absolute, we arrive finally at Matter. Matter, the other Extreme of Reality, is in every respect the antipode of God, the principle of absolute reality, and may therefore fairly be called the Nothing. Being this, it cannot well be deduced from God, and appears accordingly as a second fundamental principle of reality (Dualism).

Position of man

man's body - matter
 soul - absolute

Somewhere between Matter and the higher stages of emanation is the place of Man. He is related to both. What connects him with the inferior principle of Matter and estranges him from God, is the body. The body is the jail and the grave of the soul. This unpleasant position of the human soul is explained by Philo by a mythic process. Formerly the soul was intimately united with the Logos. From that happy position it has fallen and sunk into the miserable world of Matter in consequence of a false step. The present state of the soul is unworthy of it. To emerge from it and become united again with the Absolute is the ethical vocation of Man. To fulfil it, we must renounce and abdicate for ever all that binds us to the sensuous world, all desires and appetites. Complete extinction of passions and desires is by Philo even more emphasized than by the Stoics. But he does not stop here. It is not enough to suppress the senses, we must also overcome that bold self-confidence based on reason which was so loudly praised by the Stoics. Instead of

Ethical vocation
 suppression of senses
 2. overcome reason
 rely on God

... all sorts of ... all sorts

seeking in ourselves support and assistance, we must seek it in God. Not the "autonomy of reason," but only the union with God and the help of God can save us from the misery of the world. Complete union with God can be obtained only by the cognition of God. Not indeed by that rational cognition which human reason is capable of attaining. All rational knowledge, all science does but prepare but cannot give the knowledge of the Incomprehensible and Unknowable. Our knowledge is relative, and cannot therefore understand the Absolute. Only by a super-rational illumination, in a state of ecstasy, in which sensation, reason, consciousness vanish away, can the Absolute be comprehended by us. In such a state of rapture we become perfectly united with the Absolute, to the total absorption of our individuality, intuit God in his pure essence and being; and enjoy that indescribable blissfulness which such intuition affords.

The classical representative of the Neo-Platonism is PLOTINUS of Lykopolis (Egypt), 250 A.D.

In the system of this eminent thinker the antagonistic tendencies of the time, the Pantheism (Monism) which desires to derive Mind and Matter from one common ultimate ground, and the Dualism which insists upon a sharp distinction of the same, find once more a distinct expression.

Antagonism between the Monism + Dualism

The pantheistic tendency causes him to consider as ultimate ground of the world something that is neither thought nor matter but far superior to both and the ground of both. Being far above all finite being, an absolute and yet unlimited unity, perfectly simple and absolutely perfect, wholly indeterminate (ἀπεριόριστος), the

Pantheistic Tendency: ground of the world = X not thought matter
 πρῶτος ἕστος

(God - perfect)

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absolute ground of reality cannot be expressed by any conception of ours. Plotinus calls it "The first" ($\pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\omicron\upsilon$) or "the first God" ($\pi\rho\acute{o}\tau\omicron\varsigma \theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$).

Again, this transcendent Absolute is considered the cause of all reality. All things, spiritual and material, owe their reality to the Absolute. Here arises now again the problem how the activity of the Absolute, by which it creates and maintains the world, can be reconciled to his absolute perfectness and self-complacency. Plotinus paraphrases by similes and mysteriously sounding phrases what he cannot explain in a reasonable way. The perfectness of the Absolute, he says, is so great that it boils over. Consequently, effluxes of its perfectness emanate from it in every direction. These effluxes are, as a matter of course, not so perfect as the Absolute itself. They are eruptions of the same which resemble it more or less. As in Philo's system they form a series the perfectness of the members of which decreases as the series progresses. The first emanation is the most perfect. It is the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ or intellect. (1)

The $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ is pure thought, not discursive but intuitive. The object of his intuition is the Absolute. The $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, though still simple, yet contains in itself already a principle of multiplicity. From him emanate the ideas, that is the ideal prototypes of all things the sum total of which is the intelligible kosmos. These ideas, which Plotinus calls also spirits or demons, have their immediate source in the highest of all, the mundane soul ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$). The mundane soul is still immaterial and eternal but stands already in the direct neighborhood of the material world. Another soul emanates from the mundane soul, the soul of Nature ($\varphi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$). This (2)

(3)

(4)

Absolute
 $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ or intellect
ideas

monism in production
dualism in opposition
Absolute source of all good
 $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ intellect, pure thought
 $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ (mundane soul) in material
ideas
 $\varphi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (Soul of nature) connected with a body
Matter = source of all evils (167)

(5) shows already traces of materiality and is connected with a body (the universe). From it spring the individual souls, among them also the human soul. The last emanation is Matter which stands next to Nothing. Here the reality of the Absolute passes over into its contrary, into Nothing. Matter is the source of all evils, and as such contradictorily opposed to God, the source of all that is good (Dualism). Nevertheless it is emanated from God (Monism). In the individual souls various grades must be distinguished. The Soul of heaven, the souls of the stars, of the demons that inhabitate the regions between heaven and earth, the souls of men, animals, and plants.

The physical universe is nothing but a faint shade of the divine world though even this shade shows, in its harmonious structure, still traces of its divine origin. The human soul had once lived in the divine world before it sank down, by its own fault as well as by an unavoidable necessity, into the material world. Here it lives connected with a body. But we shall return to our real home, to the divine world, and become united again with the Absolute. The union with God can be effected only by a super-natural illumination in which God reveals himself in us. Extinguishing and annihilating all sensuous appetites, mental faculties, reason and even our personal consciousness, we can attain at last that state of illumination in which the secret of the Absolute reveals itself and in which we live in complete union with God, sharing his perfectness and his happiness.

PORPHYRIUS of Tyrus, 300 A. D.

He was a pupil of Plotinus whose system he adopt-

Physical N.
Divine N.

Soul
body

total annihilation
of human
faculty enables
man to unite with
the Absolute

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ed and modified in some points. The number of emanations was considerably augmented by him. A favourite point of his doctrine was the unity of the soul which he strongly accentuated. All individual souls are with him modes of a universal mundane soul in whose unity they are all contained. On the whole he followed the views of Plotinus.

JAMBlichus of Tyrus, 310 A. D.

Here the gods, demons and souls emanating from the Absolute and mediating between the same and Matter, amount already to several hundred.

PROKLOS of Constantinople, 450 A. D.,

arranges the emanations systematically, grouping them together in triads. Each triad consists of three distinct moments. 1) Unity of cause and effect. 2) Separation of cause from effect. 3) Return of effect to cause (anticipation of *Hegel's* scheme of Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis). The positive religious creed cuts already a great figure in his philosophy, announcing the approaching absorption of philosophy into religion in the christian era.

By an edict of the East-Roman emperor Justinianus the University of Athens was closed in the year 529. A. D. The last representatives of the Greek philosophy (Damascius) emigrated thereupon to Asia where they all died before the end of the century. The year 600 may therefore fairly be regarded as the end of the Ancient Philosophy.

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B. THE MEDIAEVAL (CHRISTIAN) PHILOSOPHY
600—1500. A. D.

Works.

Ueberweg: History of Philosophy II., transl. by Morris.

Pfleiderer: The philosophy of religion on the basis of its history, transl. from the German by Menzies. 4 vol.

v. Eicken: Geschichte und System der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung.

Introduction.

1. The *christian philosophy* has arisen from a combination of religious (jewish-christian) and graeco-philosophical elements. In order to understand completely the peculiar character of the christian philosophy it is therefore necessary to consider the process of its origin and development.

In the "Special Introduction" (p. 18) we have characterized the mediaeval view as a Dualism (of God and World, Man and Nature), in contradistinction with the *Monism* of the ancient view. We added on p. 22 that the mediaeval philosophy showed a cosmopolitan character.

Of the Greek philosophy we said (p. 18) that it signified the dissolution of the monistic view and the transition to the christian view.

Our account of the development of the Greek philosophy has borne out the truth of that statement. It

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has shown that with Anaxagoras a Dualism was brought into the Greek philosophy.

But now we add that considered from a *universal* point of view the dissolution of the ancient view as represented by the Greek philosophy *is but the one side of a great historical process by which the western civilized world advanced from the oriental Monism to the mediæval Dualism, that is to the cognition of the contrast between the Real and the Ideal, the Material and the Spiritual.*

This process has three different sides or aspects.

The *Greek philosophy* represents its *philosophical side*, that is the rational cognition of the above contrast.

1. The Greek philosophy has discovered and proved the *metaphysical* difference between the Ideal and the Sensuous-Real, between the Spiritual and the Natural. In the element of thought it discovered at the same time the Universal Human which is superior to all human (individual and national) peculiarities.

This discovery favoured, in connection with the political circumstances (loss of the political independence) the development of a *cosmopolitan view* as held by the Stoic philosophers.

2. The Jewish religion represents the *ethico-religious* side of the process.

By the efforts of the Jewish prophets the Jewish God was raised to the dignity of a holy being of highest moral elevation. The moral imperfection of the world and of earthly life was then opposed to this ideal. The Natural and Sensuous appeared insignificant and valueless in comparison with the spiritual grandeur of God.

This elevation of the national God led at last to the

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establishment of an ethical Monotheism. In virtue of his holiness and superior power the Jewish God (Jahveh) stood higher than the gods of the heathens. He was accordingly raised above them and made the supreme ruler of heaven and earth to whom all men and all peoples are subject alike. Thus the national God became a universal God, and the national view gave at last way to a cosmopolitan view.

The *Roman Empire* represents the *political side* of the process.

3. The Roman state was more than any other grounded upon the principle of *nationality*. But in the course of the long ascending development of that state this principle struck at last round into its opposite. The Romans conquered all the countries round the Mediterranean and embodied them into their empire. The Roman empire became thus at last a universal empire containing in itself almost all the nations of the then known civilized world. The members of these nations became now all subjects of the Roman empire and could even obtain the rights and privileges of a Roman citizen. It appears that in this universal empire which encompassed all nations, the principle of nationality must lose its proper meaning and applicability. The Roman empire showed at last a marked cosmopolitan aspect. It has thus practically paved the ground for the cosmopolitanism of the Christian religion. It has, even from a speculative point of view, substantially facilitated the propagation of that religion. The same spirit of tolerance which the Roman conquerors showed towards the conquered nations, they showed also towards their national gods. They ad-

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mitted them into their own religion. Temples were built for them in Rome, and they were duly worshipped at state expense. But this introduction of so many new deities had a detrimental influence upon the home deities and upon religion in general. The native gods lost a good deal of their authority. From the *many* gods which disputed each other the presidency in Rome, the Roman philosophers derived the idea of the *One God* who, as the supreme being, stood higher than they all.—Thus the *Monotheism* of the Jewish and christian religion was prepared in Rome.

2. The Greek philosophy, the development of religious thought in Palestina, and the political evolution of the Roman empire combined in preparing the way for the mediæval view. The latter found in the christian religion its religious, in the christian philosophy its speculative expression. The christian philosophy borrowed its concrete content from the christian religion and the Greek (Neo-Platonic, Platonic and Aristotelian) philosophy. The christian doctrine itself, upon which the christian philosophy chiefly rests, was influenced on the one side by the Jewish religion, on the other side by the Greek speculation (Philo). Such being the case it will be necessary to ascertain what either of them contributed to the christian religion. The contributions of both are very different since the Greek view of the world differed heavily from the Jewish view.

a. The Greek view of the world was an æsthetical *one*. It is from the æsthetical point of view chiefly that the Greeks used to contemplate the world. It is very significant that the Greek language had for "world"

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and "decoration" but one word: *κόσμος*. To them the world was a picture in still-life or rather a beautiful play going on always in the same way without origin and without any recognized end, merely for the sake of its own enjoyment. The tranquil contemplation of this spectacle was the highest pleasure which Plato and Aristotle could imagine. It is true that the thought of the restless nervous haste and trouble which fills the world was not entirely foreign to the Greek consciousness. The systems of Heraclitus and Democritus attest its presence. Yet these systems were transitory phenomena which have not exerted any lasting influence upon the development of the Greek thought. And even Heraclitus did not regard his Change or Becoming in the sense of a progress towards an end. He rather took it as an incessant permanent play repeating itself in regular circulation. He and Democritus, further, denied Becoming in an absolute sense. On the other side did the Eleatic philosophers go even so far as to deny the reality of the visible world merely ^{on} behalf of the *change* which it involves and which seemed to them incompatible with the worth and dignity of the world's being. For the same reason did Plato oppose the ideal Kosmos of eternal ideas to the empirical world of changeable things.

The Greek mind has always displayed a *naive plastic* turn, to which the Greeks have given expression in their philosophy as well as in their works of plastic art. ^{2.} What they did *not* possess was historical sense. Of the significant meaning of the *historical* development of the world they have never had a very clear idea. The idea of a *progress* in history did not touch deeply

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their mind. Foreign was to them the thought that perhaps the whole order of the universe might be a system of means subservient to the development and final realization of a *purpose* which lay beyond this order. No recognized aims lay for them beyond the play of phenomena with which experience made them acquainted. The course of events pursues the same round for ever and ever in regular repetition, without showing any progress or improvement. So far were the Greeks from a correct understanding of the meaning of historical progress that the philosophers of the third period even turned away from the historico-social reality because they regarded it as an artificial product of human arbitrariness. Therefore when the course of events, in the later times of the Greek history, assumed an unpleasant and disagreeable aspect, they lost all confidence in history and advised men to bear the Unavoidable with resignation.

As they did not behold in the play of events a progressive development towards a final end, so they did never earnestly conceive the idea that men had a mission to fulfil in the world, that each man were obliged to contribute to the realization of the end of the world's development and had to work on that place to which Providence had summoned him. Nature (either the sensuous or the ideal kosmos) lay before them as the only reality bringing forth endless generations of short-lived animals, and so also the human race as the fairest of its perishable blossoms. To live in harmony with or "according to Nature," to develop harmoniously all the faculties given to us by Nature, this ideal of fair humanity was their highest moral standard. The

want of the sense of
the mission assigned to man

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Good was to them identical with the Beautiful and Harmonious. This æsthetico-plastic frame of mind enabled the Greeks to produce unsurpassable master-works particularly in the plastic arts. It prevented them, however, from developing a lyric poetry and religious prose of the same grandeur as that of the Hebrews. It has prevented them, further, from conceiving the deep idea of a comprehensive teleological conception of the universal history as established in the Hebrew Bible.

Moreover, there is no denying of the fact that the plastic frame of the Greek mind has exercised also an disadvantageous influence upon the development of at least a section of the Greek science. The habit of contemplating the world as a beautiful whole has in a measure hindered them to acquire a scientific cognition of the details of its structure. They feared—not unjustly—that an analysis and dissolution of the whole into its constituent parts might spoil the sweet charm of the whole the graceful form of which seemed to them to comprehend all the beauty, significance and value of the thing. Therefore however great their achievements were in Art, Speculative Philosophy and those sciences which depend on observation, deduction and calculation (Geometry, Astronomy, Geography), they have done very little in the exact sciences which depend on analysis, experiment and induction, and particularly insignificant were their deeds in the technical disciplines. Their tools, machines, and mechanical contrivances were technically very primitive; sciences such as Medicine and Physics, were still in their leading strings. In Technics the Greeks were, compared with the

modern men, mere children.

This *æsthetical conception* of the world made itself felt with particular force when their dualistic distinction between the Ideal and the Real compelled the Greek philosophers to seek for a mediating principle. Although Socrates had emphasized the inner life of the mind, the *æsthetical* conception of the world remained also after him the domineering principle in the Greek speculation. Plato, who opposed the Ideal, changed only the object of the *æsthetical* contemplation by transferring it from the natural to the supernatural world, to the ideal Kosmos of the eternal ideas. This æsthetical conception determined now the nature of the mediating principle which the Greek speculation found it necessary to insert between the Ideal and the Real. This mediating principle could according to the character of the Greek speculation, be only an abstract metaphysical thought-object (Mundane Soul, Nous). The division of the world into the Ideal and the Real is here *not* the result of an *historical process* but a *necessary metaphysical state*. The Ideal and the Real are the two equally necessary and equally eternal sides of a *permanent* metaphysical contrast. They are the positive and the negative pole of the world. The mediating principle which is placed between them, does not remove this contrast by its activity; it does not even bring the parties nearer to each other. It merely fills up the empty interspace between them and establishes thus a mediate link between them. It connects them without uniting them. Again, this mediation is *not* an *historical event* that takes place at a given moment. The mediating principle is just so eternal