

1. The three factors of Reality consist of
- a) Principles by which we ^{mean} those universal laws of thought which are absolutely valid and against which even God can do nothing. All things in the world must conform to them as long as they exist.
 - b) Facts: By facts we mean the things which constitute ^{the} stuff of reality. Historical events, mental processes, objects etc, in short, the existence of the universe, regulated by the fundamental principles.
 - c) Values: By values we mean those qualities of things which we ^{call} aesthetic or moral; they manifest themselves through the stuff of the world.

Disciplines of philosophy: —

- a) Corresponding to Principles we have the Philosophy of Principles or Metaphysics, object of which is to lay down those ^{fundamental} principles + necessary suppositions ^{without} which no thought ^{is possible} ^{and no world}
- b) Corresponding to Facts we have philosophy of Facts.
 - Philosophy of Nature (Applied metaphysics)
 - P. of Facts
 - P. of mind {
 - P. of history
 - Society
 - etc
 - Psychology { empirical
 - } speculative

P. of Facts are concerned with the collections & organizations of both mental & external phenomena + their metaphysical criticism.

c) Philosophy of Values corresponds to Values.
 its object is first to collect moral convictions
 and those conditions (both subjective + objective)
~~which~~ necessary to aesthetic or moral feelings,

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next to interpret those convictions + conditions
 according to the principles of metaphysics, to
 connect them with theory + to give them their
 respective significance in the totality of
 the world.

d) Though we find three independent factors in
 the reality of the world, and as our process of
 unification stops here, we are obliged at
 least theoretically, to regard them as quite
 independent from ~~to~~ one another, yet we find
 "in them such harmony of relation going
 on between them, such order such peaceful
 course of the world, can not be overlooked
 by us and we are entitled to entertain the
 supposition, ^{that} there is some being underlying
 this reality which regulates + orders the on
 going course of the world, makes facts
 strictly observe principles, makes values
 manifest themselves through principles, in
 facts. ~~Secondly we are obliged to~~
~~make this supposition on account of~~ this
 assumption is not only reasonable but
 is strongly supported by the obligatory character
 of our moral convictions. Unless there ~~is~~ ^{exists}
 some absolute being who regulates this world,
~~the~~ absolute authority of our moral convictions
 would quite be meaningless. And that
 obligatory character not only support the

the assumption of the existence of absolute mind, but ~~also~~ also makes us to attribute to that character being the predicate of all good ^{ness} & sublimity of moral perfection. Now to show the possibility & reasonableness of the existence of such absolute being & to attribute to it ^{the nature} ~~these characters~~ which are quite in keeping with our metaphysical principles, - the ^{nature} ~~characters~~ which must necessarily produce these three factors of reality & finally to find out the relation of existing between this world and this absolute, is just the task which P. of Religion is required to fulfil. Its negative duty is to criticize the popular religious views and to reject or accept as they may ~~be~~ be at variance or ~~at~~ in conformity with our highest metaphysical principles.

3) The philosophical conception of things which ~~is~~ is at variance with common or even ~~scientific~~ scientific view, ~~it~~ lies in the following ³ points.

a) First. Things must be immaterial, ~~that~~ That the final constituent of reality must be immaterial, is the necessary conclusion we have arrived in Ontology. As long as a thing is divisible, it is not the real stuff which properly belong only to the original things, ~~which~~ constituting that compound thing. But ^{as} every divisible thing may be regarded as a compound, it has no real stuff and as every material thing has extension, it is divisible: therefore

The necessary conclusion is that ^{the} real stuff of the world must be immaterial. And the conception that the world is constituted from material atoms (as physics supposed) is false.

b) Secondly, Things must be Spiritual.

The following Argument brings us to this conclusion: — As there are many compounds of things in the world, interaction among those immaterial constituents is necessary. Now how can they interact one upon another?

All this does not belong to the question.

1) For things A + B can not come into contact because they are immaterial.

2) The action through distance is impossible. First, because it can not dissociate its force from itself. How can A's force emanate from its possessor and travel to B as nobody's force & act upon the ~~the~~ latter?

Secondly, Because this force can not be real stuff, how can real stuff emanate from the immaterial A. moreover, if that force could emanate, it must again dissociate some force to act upon A. And that force again can not act upon B, unless it for a third time emanate some force & so on ad infinitum.

Thirdly, Even if the force of A could reach B, how is it possible that it can in any way affect B?

Here we are ~~necessarily~~ compelled to make the supposition that B is spiritual.

For without this supposition, we can not explain the interaction of things in any way as B would not change its state,

if it did not feel the action upon it self
if it were not sensible to ⁺ answer to
others' action. Thus we come to the con-
clusion that all reality is spirituality.

(c) The third difference between the common +
philosophical view of things is this: —

As ~~we~~ we have stated above, the interaction
of things is quite impossible so long as we
regard things as separate, independent
things. ^{Therefore} We regard things, according to
philosophical view, as contained in one
absolute unique substance which is present
in every of them and whose final objecti-
fication is found in them. Thus the
interaction instead of being transcendent,
is immanent. The change of A causes
the change in B, without travelling through
a distance or coming into contact. This
is possible because A + B are both contained
in one absolute M. It is not the ^{independent} changes
of A + B, but simply that of M.

This refers
to the question
how can things
act upon
each other.

4 By unity of consciousness, we do not mean
that we appear to ourselves constantly
+ persistently as a identical, permanent
Ego. The fact that we are able to
appear to ourselves as such, even once,
is the strong + sufficient reason for insisting
upon the unity of consciousness. May it
we need not appear to ourselves as
unity. If we had appeared as plurality
to ourselves, it would have been ^{just} as well
strong + incontestable a reason as the
former. For unless, we admit the unity of

of consciousness, it is totally inexplicable that we appear to ourselves any how. ~~The~~ The fact that we can appear, ~~a~~ nay, we are able to appear, as anything, ^{as} unity or plurality, to ourselves, is the proper meaning of unity of consciousness. We ~~often~~ can talk of others' sensations as having no subject, or no identical subject. But we can not speaking of our own sensation, as not possessed by somebody, or as possessed by some different beings at different times. These sensations, etc, must appear to ourselves, as belonging always to one Ego. And this is what we call unity of consciousness.

5.) Utilitarian ethics identifies goodness with pleasures + takes it ^{as} its maxim that ~~we must~~ ^{we must} act so that by ~~our~~ ^{our} action the greatest amount of ^{happiness of the} greatest number is achieved. This view of ethics judges ~~an~~ conduct, ~~only~~ solely from its consequences. If the consequence produce happiness or pleasure, the action is ~~good~~ ^{good}; and the action, conducing to unhappiness, is bad.

Our chief objection to this view consists of the following pts:

1) The vagueness of the meaning of the greatest pleasure. Pleasure may be different according to different persons and the indefiniteness of its meaning of the maxim, leaves us quite scared as to the line of conduct we are about to follow.

- 2) Even if the meaning of the maxim were clear we could not foresee all possible consequences of our action. Our practical experience clearly tells us the obstructions + resistance we meet in life against ~~the~~ ^{pre-}meditated consequence of an event.
- 3) It is not just in judging of an action, to take its consequence only into account and to neglect totally the motives of the agent. ~~It is true~~ ~~I can't experience that~~ Good motives may lead to bad consequence + obscene, frivolous intentions may give rise to the beneficial consequence of the agent's conduct. In such cases, it is wholly unjust to pass our sentence only from the consequence of conduct.
- 4) Utilitarian view asserts that the welfare of individual, depends upon the welfare of the society, therefore one must act for the welfare of society. This is going out actual case. For ~~so~~ society is not, to a large extent, affected by beneficial + maleficent conduct of individuals. A man may receive all the benefits of society without accomplishing any good deeds for the sake of society. Thus the principle of reciprocity ~~is~~ not applicable here, though it is certainly true in the long run.
- 5) It neglects totally the qualitative

difference of pleasure, merely taking
 account of the quantitative difference
 of pleasure! Obscene, base pleasure
 may be greater than holy, noble
 one, as far as its intensity is con-
 cerned. And according to Utilitarian
 view, the former conduct must be good
 the latter bad which is absurd.

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